Publications

Here is a selection of publications available online. These relate to right-wing extremism, discrimination and racism in the Netherlands. Suggestions for additions and additional information about the publications are welcome. It can (confidential) are provided to us by. Look at 'Contact’ for our data.

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THE PARTY PROGRAMS FOR THE ELECTIONS 2023 LEGAL STATEMENT?

The manifesto for the elections 2023 rechtsstatelijk?
Jaar:
2023
Taal:Aantal blz:
46
Soort Uitgave:
Beschrijving:

The committee is in favor of ten of the eighteen party programs examined-
found couples who failed to meet the minimum standards of the rule of law
to endure. In the previous elections 2021 seven of the fourteen scored on-
party programs examined raise one or more red flags.
The red disqualification mainly concerns proposals in the field of immigration-
tion and asylum, such as the use of so-called asylum quotas, but also
imposing harsher minimum sentences, which guarantees the independence of the
the judge's ability to administer justice in individual cases. A number of
proposals also received red because they openly discriminate against them
of certain groups of citizens or they are denied access to justice or
hindered.
However, is also present during the analysis of the election manifestos at the commissionis-
This has created a picture of increasing attention among the majority of the party-
and for further adjustment and strengthening of democratic legitimacy
of the board. Various parties are making efforts to stop distrust-
wen, but rather to let trust be the starting point for government action. A
government with a human face is one of the lines that connect the different
binds election manifestos together, which also looks back at the
surcharges affair and the state of affairs surrounding gas extraction in Groningen.

Right-wing extremism on social media platforms?

Development paths and action perspectives
Jaar:
2023
Taal:Aantal blz:
162
Soort Uitgave:
Beschrijving:

Main findings
This research has mapped out several different development paths
of right-wing extremist radicalization and what the role is in this
social media platforms, with specific attention to the operation of
recommendation algorithms. The role of the offline context was also examined
development paths of right-wing extremist radicalization. Based on
the findings describe possible feasible perspectives for action
for the government to prevent right-wing extremist radicalization via online platforms
to prevent.
The main findings of the research are the following:
z A large number of risk factors on an individual basis, group- and together-
level contribute to the development of radicalization processes.
Development paths of radicalization are extremely complex, where both
online and offline factors play a role and interact. If the
influence of the online context on extremist beliefs
understand, this interaction should be examined.
z The role of recommendation algorithms in right-wing extremist radicalization
within the online context, according to recent scientific research
limited. Users' personal choices are just as important-
rich, such as sharing links to extremist content; the subscription-
ner / tracking certain channels on social media platforms and on
in this way are selectively confronted with more extreme content;
meeting like-minded people in echo chambers; and personal surfing/
search behavior. People automatically look for more extreme content and
deliberately enter certain search terms for this purpose, or click on the
more extreme recommendations.

Anti-institutional extremism in the Netherlands

A serious threat to the democratic legal order?
Jaar:
2023
Taal:Aantal blz:
44
Soort Uitgave:
Beschrijving:
The relationship with the extreme right is described:

2.3 Overlap with others (extremist) groups
Anti-institutional extremism is not part of right-wing extremism, or vice versa. Although there is a lot of overlap between the two movements in terms of hostility to the current government and institutions, based on similar underlying narratives, the AIVD sees it as two different movements. The biggest difference lies in the way in which 'the own group' is seen. The right-wing extremist is primarily committed to the "white race" that is considered superior. Dominant within right-wing extremism in the Netherlands is the so-called 'population conspiracy theory' in which right-wing extremists assume that there is a Jewish elite that consciously facilitates mass migration to weaken the 'white race'. As a result of this mass migration, the proportion of white people in the Netherlands is said to be declining, pushing out the so-called white identity. The government would act on behalf of this Jewish elite. Anti-institutional extremists are committed to the people as a whole and see themes such as migration policy as new evidence that the 'evil elite’ to oppress the people, but also see this oppression in a range of other themes. Anti-institutional extremists are not necessarily anti-Semitic, nor do they see the "white race" as superior. Although many messages cited by anti-institutional extremists have anti-Semitic origins, with stories that the elite are made up of families like the Rothschilds, explicit anti-Semitic statements are rarely made. It is generally referred to the elite, without referring to the Jews’ to refer. The AIVD considers it likely that many supporters of the narrative about an 'evil elite’ unfamiliar with the anti-Semitic origins of many conspiracies. The anti-institutional extremist narrative can therefore potentially appeal to a much more ethnically and politically diverse audience. The right-wing extremist narrative is less able to do this because right-wing extremists want to protect the so-called white race and oppose other 'races'. But because of themes such as energy prices, immigration and the housing shortage are, according to both groups, the fault of the government and institutions, can both agree with the narrative about an “evil elite”. The narrative is very versatile and different types of groups join in depending on the theme that appeals to them. This joint aversion to the government and institutions, and the belief in a plot by a powerful elite that rules the roost in the background, unites them. Where these groups overlap, anti-Semitic statements are made, referring to known anti-Semitic elements of messages. Right-wing extremist groups also opportunistically use themes and actions from anti-institutional extremists to reach a larger audience and normalize their own message..
At the same time, there are themes that play an opposite role in both groups. On climate issues, for example, anti-institutional extremists clearly differ from at least some right-wing extremist groups. Where anti-institutional groups see climate policy as the way of the 'evil elite’ to oppress the people, a small proportion of right-wing extremists consider making agriculture more sustainable an important part of nationalism, where nature is treated with care. Another part of the right-wing extremists argues that the ecological crisis encourages mass immigration. According to them, governments and multinationals are the causes of this ecological crisis. Also about what the world should look like without the current 'evil elite', right-wing extremists and anti-institutional extremists have different views. Anti-institutional extremists want the “evil elite’ overthrow in the first place, without a coherent picture of what should happen next. Right-wing extremists want to work towards a new system, in which they have more influence, in order to work towards a society in which the 'white race’ and their way of life are protected.

Except for the overlap with right-wing extremism, are there any, more surprising, signals that some extremists of Islamic extremism are interested in the narrative about an “evil elite”. Conversely, anti-institutional instigators have shown interest in more conservative views of Islam. They can each other, just like the right-wing extremists, probably find in their shared anti-institutional sentiment and conservative values. Although there is some overlap with some left-wing extremist movements in terms of their ideas about, for example, the role of government, little cooperation is visible.

Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 58

Author:
Jaar:
2023
Taal:Aantal blz:
47
Soort Uitgave:
Beschrijving:
Right-wing extremism
The terrorist threat from right-wing terrorist movements, such as accelerationism, is unchanged. However, the size of the movement has not grown and the very disturbing expressions on the internet have not yet translated into actual attacks in the Netherlands.. It is worrying, however, that several hundred young Dutch people actively spread right-wing terrorist ideas online and worship perpetrators of terrorist attacks.. In addition, there are concerns about further normalization of right-wing extremist ideas in the social and political domain.

(…)

Quran destruction puts the Netherlands on the radar of jihadist organizations
Global jihadist organizations have long regarded the Netherlands as a legitimate target for an attack. As a result of recent Koran destruction in our country (see box Destruction of the Koran in the Netherlands and Sweden) however, the Netherlands has come into the picture even more emphatically. Several pro-ISIS outlets have used social media to call for retaliation against Western countries, including explicitly Sweden and to a lesser extent the Netherlands. At the end of January, a media organization associated with ISKP, the Afghan branch of ISIS, threats uttered against 'infidels' in response to the Koran destruction. The Netherlands was specifically mentioned as a target. In a late February 2023 published video production, the leader of the anti-Islam movement Pegida comes into the picture. A poster was also published in the English-language magazine of ISKP containing the Dutch and Swedish flag and the call to carry out attacks on shops, among other things., police officers and music concerts.
It turned out to be no empty threats. At the beginning of February, twenty people associated with ISKP were arrested in Istanbul for planning attacks on diplomatic posts of Western countries, including the Dutch and Swedish consulate in Istanbul, and on churches and synagogues. Turkish media reported that Turkish intelligence feared that ISKP had ordered its supporters in Turkey to carry out the attacks in retaliation for Quran destruction in Sweden and the Netherlands. Nine Western countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, had closed their consulates in Istanbul for some time the week before due to the tensions and increased threat.
Sweden locked up 11 April also removed his embassy in the Pakistani capital Islamabad for security reasons. In Sweden itself, op 4 april 2023 five men arrested on suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack. According to the Swedish security service, the potential attackers have ties to international ISIS networks through groups on Facebook. These groups contained ISIS fighters and collected money for the terrorist organization. Since the Koran burning in January, there are said to be several concrete threats of attack in Sweden. Fearing new terrorist attacks, the Swedish police increased the security of symbolically important objects, among other things. In Sweden, the threat level will remain unchanged for the time being 3 (on a scale of 5).
Jihadist organizations more often explicitly quote countries in their terrorist propaganda. Scientific research shows that this does not always lead to an increase in the number of attacks in those countries. However, the threat of attacks in Istanbul and Sweden, as well as the attacks on the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, show that jihadist organizations can be guided by incidents in the West when choosing a target., which they regard as blasphemy.
Terrorist groups also use perceived blasphemy to reinforce their terrorist message and justify the use of violence. In this way they try to inspire radicalized individuals in Europe to commit an attack without having to make active preparations themselves.. Perpetrators of attacks in response to perceived blasphemy are in most cases not affiliated with terrorist groups, but usually claim to act out of personal conviction. Past attacks show that Muslims are of different religious orientation (sunni, Shiite, salafist, Sufi) may be susceptible to calls for retaliation, even if those were done years ago. So stuck in August 2022 a man the British-Indian writer Salman Rushdie several times during a lecture. The perpetrator may have been inspired by the death sentence of Rushdie, the spiritual leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1989 had pronounced after publication of the work The Satanic Verses. Half april 2023 an Islamic cleric in Pakistan posted a renewed call on social media to kill Geert Wilders. The reason for this was the drawing competition for Mohammedcartoons that Wilders entered 2018 wanted to organize.
In the short term, it carries jihadist propaganda, in which the Netherlands is explicitly mentioned as a country that is guilty of blasphemy, contributes to an increased terrorist threat against our country and our interests abroad. The threat against Dutch targets in countries where cells affiliated with ISIS are already active, is larger than in the Netherlands itself.

KADER – Koran destruction in the Netherlands and Sweden
Op 22 January, the leader of the anti-Islam movement Pegida tore up a Quran during a demonstration in front of the temporary House of Representatives in The Hague. Op 12 February he did the same during a demonstration in Utrecht, op 22 March in Leiden and op 15 April in front of the town hall in Amsterdam. In Sweden, a Danish anti-Islam activist burned to death 21 January 2023 a Quran for the Turkish embassy. In april 2022 he already burned several Korans during a controversial tour of Sweden, which led to violent disturbances in several cities.
In several Islamic countries, the destruction of the Koran has led to angry reactions and demonstrations against Sweden and the Netherlands, among others. Anger about perceived sacrilege or blasphemy is often vented in the Netherlands within the framework of the democratic constitutional state, such as through demonstrations or petitions. In Amsterdam, the DENK party chairman asked the mayor to ban any future Koran tearing in the city. The national chapter called for a national ban on tearing up holy books.
In the past, however, extremist Muslims in Western countries have also carried out attacks in response to blasphemy, such as the attack on the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo (2015). The most famous example in our country is the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a member of the jihadist network the Hofstad group.
(…)
Right-wing extremist threat

The right-wing extremist threat, including right-wing terrorism, has become more diffuse and unpredictable in recent years. This applies to the Netherlands as well as to other Western countries. A minority of right-wing extremists pose a violent threat. Another part is actively working on normalizing their intolerant ideas.

There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack
Violent threat from right-wing terrorism remains conceivable
Within the Netherlands, the main right-wing extremist threat of violence comes from online followers of accelerationist and similar right-wing terrorist ideas. Accelerationism is based on the population theory.(1) Supporters want to use terrorist violence to precipitate a race war, with which the current political system can be replaced by a white ethno-state. There are probably a few hundred Dutch-speaking supporters of these ideas. This number does not seem to have increased in the past year, but there is progression within the movement. In addition, more experienced participants in online networks retreat to closed app groups with a select group of acquaintances.
The Dutch right-wing terrorist environment continues to have a low level of organisation. It mainly concerns susceptible boys and men from thirteen to the late twenties, who often have an unstable home situation and sometimes struggle with psychosocial or psychopathological problems. This problem can make it difficult to enter into social contacts in the physical world, leading them to look for digital entitlement. Online they share their own language and iconography, for example through memes (see box Memes as right-wing extremist means of communication).
New members joining online groups take inspiration from decommissioned organizations like Atomwaffen Division or The Base, loose extremist or terrorist text fragments and the actions of previous attackers. Dutch supporters of accelerationism often cut and paste pieces of ideas to put together their personal right-wing terrorist ideology (see box Extremism unpredictable due to 'cut-and-paste ideologies'). Some look for an appropriate ideology to match their lust for violence. Their shifting ideological underpinnings can make it easier to move from one online group to another, or to be a member of several groups at the same time. Because elaborated extremist ideologies are rarely discussed in these online groups, and mainly superficial violent ideas are shared and attackers are honored, these groups may be more accessible to new interested parties.
In the Netherlands, members of this right-wing terrorist online milieu have not committed any terrorist attacks. Also worldwide, the number of attacks from accelerationist corners remains relatively limited for the time being, especially in recent years.

KADER – Memes as right-wing extremist means of communication
Memes are popular within right-wing extremist groups on the internet, because they can spread far-right ideas online in a short time frame in a simple and subtle way to a wider audience, often packaged as a joke. The result of such memes may be that the content is no longer seen as problematic and becomes normalized in public debates. Right-wing extremists and terrorists share memes with a more explicit extremist content in their own online communities, such as their fascination with violence and weapons, and their admiration for right-wing terrorist attackers.
However, more and more radicalized right-wing extremist young people are being arrested in the Netherlands and other European countries, mostly because of (online) incitement or dissemination of terrorist content. When attack plans are nevertheless intercepted, are often still at an early stage. The fact that more and more arrests are being made does not necessarily mean that more right-wing terrorist activities are taking place, but above all that security services have a better view of the existing threat.
The Netherlands has historically seen little right-wing extremist violence (see box Large differences in right-wing extremist violence in Europe), but the Dutch adherents seem to be detached from this non-violent tradition due to their online activities in an international environment. This increases the risk of them resorting to violence. At the same time, the lack of organized right-wing extremist networks, that could facilitate acts of violence, have a dampening effect on the threat of violence. Finally, the young age of the group raises the question of the extent to which they are currently able to plan an attack with some complexity (see box Right-wing extremist violence rarely committed by young people in Europe).
KADER – Major differences in right-wing extremist violence in Europe
Despite the increased attention for right-wing extremism in Europe, since 1990 there is a decrease in violence from that corner, waarbij 2021 was even one of the least violent years – whether or not because of the corona pandemic. There are large differences in right-wing extremist violence in individual European countries. In absolute numbers, most violence takes place in Germany, followed by the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece and Spain. Relative to the number of inhabitants, most violence takes place in Greece and Germany, while the Scandinavian countries also score high. Historically, the Netherlands has had very little right-wing extremist violence, with only a few known incidents of violence in between 2015 en 2022. Differences also exist in target choices: where violence in Northern Europe is mainly directed against ethnic and religious minorities, in Southern Europe, it is precisely political opponents such as anti-fascists that are attacked.

KADER – Right-wing extremist violence in Europe rarely by young people
Most right-wing extremist violence in Europe is of a different nature than the attacks that accelerationists fantasize about online. Large-scale or prepared attacks such as in Bratislava 2022 remain exceptions. According to the Norwegian scientific research company C-Rex, the 26 far-right attacks in Western Europe with fatalities between 2015 en 2022 only five perpetrators younger than 25 years involved, one of whom was a minor. No fewer than twelve perpetrators were over the age of forty. While young people in particular distribute terrorist content online, the actual attackers in Europe are often much older.
On Friday 23 december 2022 shot a French man from 69 three Kurds dead in Paris. In addition, three people were seriously injured. He declared a "pathological hatred" towards foreigners and held specific grudges against the Kurdish community. In 2021 the same man with a saber also injured several people at a refugee camp. He remains in a psychiatric institution while awaiting trial. French authorities are treating the case as a hate crime and not terrorism.
The attack shows similarities with an attack on a migrant center in Dover, England, op 30 oktober 2022. Two people were slightly injured after a 66-year-old Briton threw several firebombs. The man committed suicide shortly afterwards. This attack also probably involved psychological or psychosocial problems. Although this attack was initially not considered terrorism either, that changed after right-wing extremist messages from the perpetrator were found on social media. Both attacks appear to stem from a link between deep-rooted hatred of foreigners or Muslims and personal resentment and misfortune, negative experiences with the government and sometimes some ideological components.

However, it remains worrying that the right-wing terrorist online environment also has supporters in the Netherlands. The adherents of this idea, both in the Netherlands and abroad, can immerse themselves in rabid content for years, until a casual incident leads them to concrete violence. Due to the international ideological interconnectedness and the online nature, attacks in one country can inspire potential attackers on the other side of the world to commit a similar act. The attacker at an LGBTI bar in Bratislava in early October 2022 was initially inspired by the Christchurch attack 2019 and was killed by a right-wing terrorist attack in Buffalo, USA, in May 2022 prompted to take action. Copying behavior is actively encouraged within the right-wing terrorist online environment. This does not have to take place in the short term: research shows that right-wing terrorist copycats can take plenty of time to plan their attacks. The actual ideological, practical and psychosocial preparation for an attack can take a long time.

Right-wing extremism
The right-wing extremist landscape in the Netherlands
The alt-right movement, together with the accelerationists, form the so-called 'new generation' of right-wing extremists. In contrast to classic right-wing extremists such as neo-Nazis, supporters of this generation do not wear visible right-wing extremist symbols, clothes or hairstyles. As a result, they are much less immediately recognizable as such in public life. The alt-right movement in the Netherlands used to consist of relatively young, highly educated men. Due to, among other things, the normalization of ideas and the disappearance of groups such as Erkenbrand, this composition has changed to a more diverse group in terms of age and education level.
The new generation of right-wing extremists strives, as stated in the previous paragraph, a white ethnostate and fears the 'repopulation' of the Netherlands (and other Western countries). They often blame the changing composition of the population on the government and its institutions that deliberately and with a malicious motive promote migration. In addition, they also hold feminists and the LGBTI community responsible, because they would hinder the reproduction of the white race. Alt-right supporters currently view the use of violence to spark a race war in the short term as counterproductive to the growth of the movement. The alt-right movement mainly tries to influence public opinion and the prevailing attitudes in a country, whether or not through participation in the democratic system. By always looking for the edge of the permissible and shocking, they ensure that extremist ideas continue to normalize. The line between accelerationism and the alt-right movement is quite diffuse, especially online. Within the alt-right movement, the notion is that violence in self-defense may be unavoidable.
Due to cultural and ideological differences, but also through mutual social conflicts, the right-wing extremist landscape in the Netherlands remains fragmented. Groups often manage to pull together, with the population theory as a connecting factor.
Normalization of right-wing extremist ideas
In the past six months, it has become increasingly common to propagate right-wing extremist ideas. It openly and (virtually) uncritical discussion of xenophobic and partly racist ideas is visible on social media, but also in the political discourse, the public broadcasting system and daily life.
The projected texts on the Erasmus Bridge during the turn of the year are illustrative of the aim to normalize the right-wing extremist movement (see box Extremist laser projections in the Netherlands). By mixing activist and right-wing extremist expressions, right-wing extremist ideas are made more accessible to a wide audience. For tactical reasons, right-wing extremists not only name their own 'ethnic superiority', but they mainly emphasize that the Dutch 'cultural identity' is threatened by the arrival of migrants. For example, they point to the disappearance of 'traditions' such as the appearance of Zwarte Piet. By responding to the concerns of a larger part of the population about the loss of traditions, culture and identity, right-wing extremists try to make larger groups sensitive to the population theory.
KADER – Extremist laser projections in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands there have been since December 2022 laser projections with racist and anti-Semitic texts. These right-wing extremist laser actions serve to spread propaganda, attract new members and further normalize the ideas.
In Venlo, for example, texts were projected onto a UWV building and a shop at the end of December. Texts then appeared on the Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam on New Year's Eve during the countdown that was shown live on TV. The right-wing extremist group that claimed this action, seems to have given the starting signal for this new modus operandi in the Netherlands, also known as projection bombing. Relatively simple and cheap means ensure a wide range, especially when it generates media attention. Both right-wing and left-wing activists abroad, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, have been using these types of projections for some time. A group of neo-Nazis in the US in particular seems to serve as inspiration for the projections in the Netherlands. Since the turn of the year, laser projections have been taking place in the Netherlands at the municipal office in Alkmaar (18 January), the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam (6 februari), the Hemweg power station and a hotel in Amsterdam (around 14 februari) and the municipal office in Eindhoven (during Carnival 20 februari).
Some of the projections have been claimed by a small but radical network of Nazi sympathizers with close ties to other far-right and right-wing extremist groups. There is no threat of violence from this group, but some group members do participate in Telegram groups where there is speculation about the perpetration of right-wing extremist attacks. Several suspects have been arrested on suspicion of involvement in the projections.
The success of actions by right-wing extremist groups is largely determined by the attention the actions generate. For these groups, any form of publicity is good publicity. But far-reaching provocation can also damage objectives. This is the case when right-wing extremist texts are overly anti-Semitic or racist, or, for example, when choosing locations that are very sensitive, such as the Anne Frank House.
Preparing for a violent confrontation
The alt-right movement challenges the fundamental rights of groups in society and thus undermines the democratic legal order. Where supporters generally try to disguise their more extreme and violent ideas from the wider public, such expressions are shared in increasingly larger online groups. They label violence there as justified under the guise of “self-defense” or “necessary evil”.
Supporters of the alt-right movement are preparing in various ways for what they see as an inevitable violent confrontation with their opponents. Sometimes this seems harmless. In these circles, for example, people practice physical training together or otherwise to purify the body and keep it fit, but also to gain combat skills. It becomes more problematic when trying to obtain weapons. In DTN 56 has already been mentioned the interest of right-wing extremists in 3D-printed weapons. Arrests in February 2023 (see box Extremist laser projections in the Netherlands) a crossbow and 3D-printed crossbow parts were seized from two suspects. Right-wing extremists are also interested in membership of shooting clubs. It is also worrying that some of them aspire to a job in the Ministry of Defence.
The MIVD sees since 2020 increased interest among right-wing extremists to work for the armed forces. Right-wing extremism could pose a threat to the deployability of the armed forces and to the democratic legal order.
KADER – Extremism unpredictable due to 'cut-and-paste ideologies'
With anti-institutional extremists, but also among right-wing extremists, defined ideologies are increasingly giving way to individual cut-and-paste ideologies. This occurs when individuals combine loose fragments of different extremist ideologies into their own personal beliefs. These fragments of ideas can complement each other, but can sometimes seem to contradict each other. For example, supporters of conspiracy theories about an evil elite may contain elements of right-wing extremism, incel culture, spiritualism, or mix Christian and cultural traditionalism in their ideology. Global connectivity through social media and other online platforms is a major contributor to these cut-and-paste ideologies: susceptible individuals will always find something that suits them in an almost unlimited supply of extremist ideas. They form their own extremist profile by picking precisely those elements from the ideological offer, that justify their own dissatisfaction. Regardless of their personal cut-and-paste ideologies, anti-institutional extremists do share a number of common elements, such as belief in conspiracy theories and an aversion to the established order.
Unclear, changing and mixed views often go hand in hand with personal grievances, very negative experiences with the government and psychological problems. Such factors may make some individuals more susceptible to extremist ideas. The mixing of bouts of ideology with resentment or personal problems makes it more difficult to recognize extremism as such, and makes the threat more unpredictable.
(1) According to the population theory, certain groups change, often "the Jews" or "the left-wing elite", the population composition of Western countries in a systematic manner, by deliberately replacing white people with people from a different cultural or ethnic background. This far-right conspiracy theory is steeped in anti-Semitism and glorified by right-wing extremist attackers like Tarrant and Breivik.

AIVD jaarverslag 2022

Jaar:
2023
Taal:Aantal blz:
58
Soort Uitgave:
Beschrijving:

On the extreme right:

1.1 Right Terrorism
• The AIVD has in 2022 a number of times a possible right-wing terrorist threat (to help) to prevent.
• The largest on the rightterrorist threat emanates from a new generation of the rightextremists, who mainly interact with each other online.
• Anti-Semitism is central within contemporary right-wing extremist movements.
The threat of right-wing terrorism in the Netherlands is in 2022 not reduced. During the year, the AIVD prevented a possible right-wing terrorist threat on a number of occasions by actively disrupting it. The service also issued five official messages on the subject to the Public Prosecution Service.
The police arrested (on that, among other things) a number of people on suspicion of activities linked to right-wing terrorism. In addition, the AIVD has informed fellow services abroad several times (possible) threats, so they could take action.
Developments abroad strengthen the threat assessment. Right-wing terrorists committed attacks in Slovakia (Bratislava) and the US (Buffalo). And in Belgium and Germany, the police arrested several right-wing extremists who had built up an arsenal of weapons.
The group that poses the greatest right-wing terrorist threat is a relatively new generation of right-wing extremists, consisting of (young) men, who are in international contact with each other online, in varying chat groups, channels and platforms. There they justify and glorify terrorist violence. The largest and most dominant source of inspiration for right-wing terrorist violence is 'accelerationism'. So called because supporters want to accelerate what they see as an impending racial struggle. In their view, violence is a good means for this. They expect this racial struggle to lead to a social revolution in their favor.
Although the composition of the Dutch movement is constantly changing - online profiles are being added, and online profiles disappear again – the size still seems to consist of several hundred followers. Comparable to last year. It is difficult to predict which supporters will actually commit terrorist violence (want) going to use.
Within contemporary right-wing extremism, anti-Semitism is particularly central. Right-wing extremists sometimes use social changes to further propagate their ideology. In this way, they frame demographic changes as a plot by 'the Jewish elite' to consciously weaken the white race.
Their repopulation conspiracy theory states that the so-called elite would work on this through 'repopulation', mixing or replacing 'the white race'. The instrument for this would be to stimulate mass immigration, especially from Islamic and African countries. Immigrants who, in their view, would have more children on average, and have a lower IQ. If that would have sufficiently weakened or diluted the white population, 'the Jewish elite' would then be able to get them under control more easily. Some right-wing extremist groups blame left-wing parties, feminists and the LGBTIQ+ community that they contribute to that perceived development – ​​the latter two, because they would ensure less 'white offspring'.
Inextricably linked to the threat posed in 2022 was based on accelerationism in particular and the right-wing extremist movement in general, is that the ideas are mainly shared online, promoted and discussed. What is characteristic of this is that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the different groups, groups and individuals moving through each other. The same profiles can be active in accelerationist chat groups, neoNazi channels, in groups that identify as alt-right (a collective noun, vanaf 2016 brought over from the US, for a new generation of white nationalists who want to 'keep the white race pure' - it is not a coherent group with unified ideas), and ethnonationalist groups (groups that consider the white race to be the basis for a country's national identity and not, for example, shared values ​​or culture).
In channels that do not appear to support terrorist attacks, sympathy can still be expressed for the perpetrators, and hatred and violence can be normalized. Although only a small group of right-wing extremists appear to be in favor of terrorist violence, online, the distinction between supporters and opponents of violence is not always clear. In the right-wing extremist online environment, the culture is so fundamentally contradictory, and his provocation and morbid humor so common, that it is not self-evident who is a supporter, sympathisant of trol is.
A second characteristic of the online landscape is how messages are packaged and distributed. Rarely in a way that is for the unsuspecting (young) viewer or follower is recognizably right-wing extremist. But often packaged as 'humor' in pictures and memes, who are hateful towards one group in particular. For example, LGBTIQ+, of feminists, leftists, non-Western immigrants, Muslims, Jews or politicians. Such images and memes are spread outside their own channels, including in online games, and are often aimed at young people and a broader audience. The AIVD sees a tendency that violent propaganda sometimes creates followers simply because of the violence. Some young viewers are particularly fascinated by the use of weapons and violence. In a number of cases, the right-wing extremist ideology and hatred towards other population groups will only play a role later in the radicalization process.. Young men, that are in international contact with each other, justify and glorify terrorist violence.
1.2 Right-wing extremism
• Non-violent right-wing extremist groups can endanger the democratic legal order of the Netherlands.
• Their ideas can lead to radicalization and are at odds with the way the Netherlands is organized.
• Extremist drivers are trying to take full advantage of social discussions.
To protect the democratic legal order, the AIVD also investigates right-wing extremist groups that do not support terrorist attacks. Because their ideas are at odds with the ideas that are the foundation of the democratic legal order. If their movement were to become substantial in size or influence, it could ultimately endanger the survival of the democratic legal order in the Netherlands.
Non-violent extremist groups can also provide a breeding ground for radicalization, by how they shape adherents socially and ideologically.
Individual adherents can ultimately take the message of terroristembracing oriented movements.
The right-wing extremist movement in the Netherlands is diverse, and consists of a small group of neo-Nazis, groups that are mainly anti-Islam, so-called identitarian groups (who say they strive to 'preserve the national identity' of every country, within clear national boundaries) and people- and ethnonationalists.
What the groups share despite their differences, is the population conspiracy theory. There are also (younger) drivers who hope that they can initiate more cooperation between the various right-wing extremists around that idea in Europesche currents, and that she is such a big one (international) can build movement.
Technical possibilities and the shared language and culture online make this easier than in the past. Yet forming a large movement has not been successful so far. Cultural and ideological differences stand in the way of this.
The greatest threat posed by non-violent right-wing extremist groups, is that they know how to achieve their extreme ideas, conspiracy thinking and (disguised) anti-Semitism is accepted by many people. Right-wing extremist supporters are therefore trying to profit from social issues. For example, they use the political discussion about how much migration is desirable, if (online) elements of the population conspiracy theory
propagate.

Online extreme right-wing radicalization

Guidelines for a preventive approach
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The extreme right seems to be making a cautious advance in the Netherlands. Deze
takes place mainly online and therefore distinguishes itself in important ways
points of the 'traditional', extreme right based on physical encounters.
There would even be a “completely new generation of right-wing extremists”
(Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands, nr. 53, 54).
There are several factors that make this a worrying development.
First of all, online radicalization can happen very quickly. Because of the
anonymity that the computer screen offers, are conversations within chat groups
often more extreme than in the physical sphere, where newcomers enter
such groups quickly conform to the group mores – without
to realize that some statements arise from exaggerations and/or
or bullshit (Wagenaar, 2021).
In addition, the Internet provides access to international networks, after
deletion often reappears under a different name (Hart et al. 2021).
This has led to the current extreme right in the Netherlands becoming strongly international
oriented, especially the influence of the extreme right
the United States has increased. This is reflected, for example, in the support
for the so-called international accelerationist networks, in which is
talked about things like starting a race war through
of terrorist attacks. A few hundred Dutch young people would
be part of such networks. The NCTV recently reported that
the danger of an attack in the Netherlands in the case of the extreme right
lies in this corner in particular (Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands, nr. 56).

Phenomenon analysis Extremism Northern Netherlands

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The extremist landscape in the Netherlands has developed strongly in recent years. Where in the public image the emphasis has long been on jihadism, other forms of extremism have come to the fore in recent years. Since the outbreak of the corona pandemic in 2019 the increasing hardening and division of the social and political debate are visible. Anti-government sentiments are more explicitly expressed publicly, for example in relation to the corona- and nitrogen policy. Moreover, more people seem to radicalize online under the influence of conspiracy theorists and/or radicals- and far-right groups.

Particulars: Right-wing extremism on page 21 - 23 and further

Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 57

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Right-wing extremism
Accelerationism remains the main right-wing extremist threat of violence. This movement propagates terrorist violence as a legitimate means to achieve the ideal of a white ethno-state. One of the pillars of accelerationism is the so-called repopulation theory, a conspiracy theory that is increasingly becoming part of the public debate in the Netherlands. According to accelerationists, the alleged repopulation can be countered with violence and precipitating a race war. Although accelerationist attacks in Europe have so far been rare and accelerationists mainly express themselves online, the inherently violent ideology makes an attack from this movement conceivable.
(…)
The main right-wing extremist threat of violence continues to emanate from accelerationism. Like many other right-wing extremist movements, accelerationism is based on the population theory (see 'Normalization of the population theory in the Netherlands'), with supporters of accelerationism emphasizing precipitating a race war. With this war, accelerationists want to create chaos and replace the current political system with a white National Socialist ethno-state. As described in previous DTNs, they view the use of terrorist violence as a justifiable means of unleashing that struggle. New accelerationist publications once again confirm that attacks by lone perpetrators and large-scale attacks on vital infrastructure, such as the power network, telecommunications and oil transportation, must contribute to the intended unleashing of a race war.
There are probably a few hundred Dutch-speaking supporters of such right-wing terrorist ideology. The number of Dutch-speaking supporters seems to have increased since 2021 not to have increased. Despite this stagnation, the movement is progressing: some individuals leave accelerationist networks and others join new ones. The Dutch-speaking right-wing terrorist environment also has a low level of organisation. A threat of violence emanates from one person. The profile of the trailers is also unchanged. The ideas are particularly attractive to vulnerable boys and men 13 tot 30 years old, who often have an unstable home situation and sometimes struggle with psychosocial problems or psychopathological conditions, which makes it difficult to establish social contacts. They come into contact with the ideas through the internet and online gaming. The online nature makes it difficult to estimate who will resort to violence: those who shout the loudest online are not necessarily the ones who also take physical action.
Online, Dutch-language accelerationists use open and private social media platforms for communication, recruitment and sharing propaganda. The wide reach of open social media platforms is used, after which it redirects to closed channels. There, accelerationists have more room to vent their ideas in the most extreme form. Also the trend towards alternative end-to-end encrypted social media, such as Wire and Element (formerly Riot), continues. This is in line with the growing privacy- and security awareness of right-wing extremist movements and complicates the view of intelligence- and security services on their online expressions. Accelerationists don't stay on the same social media platforms all the time, but moving from one platform to another. Sometimes they do this voluntarily, for example due to the emergence of advanced platforms. In other cases, content moderation forces them to switch to other social media platforms. New groups are also regularly added while others disappear.
Outside the internet, right-wing terrorism is less common than initially assumed. Attacks with a right-wing extremist or accelerationist motive are rare in Europe. However, this does not mean that this ideology does not pose a threat, because the possibility of violence remains. Thus took place in Slovakia at the beginning of October 2022 an attack with an accelerationist motive took place, in which two people died (see section 'Right-wing terrorist attacks inspired by accelerationism and the population theory'). In addition, six people were arrested in Europe last year for planning or preparing a terrorist attack based on such a motive and several accelerationists were again arrested this year, for example in England, Germany and Slovakia.
In October, a man was convicted in the Netherlands of sedition and the online distribution of right-wing terrorist material. The online dissemination of such material may incite terrorist crimes. Also the dissemination of apparently less inflammatory content, for example in the form of supposedly humorous memes, contributes to the spread and normalization of radical ideas.
Normalization of the population theory in the Netherlands
A similarity between accelerationism and most other right-wing extremist currents is the belief in the population theory. Terrorists use it to legitimize their actions, but the theory comes from alt-right. It is a given that the demographic composition of Western countries has changed in recent decades, but supporters of the population theory assume malicious intent. According to the theory, certain groups, often "the Jews" or "the left-wing elite", systematically change the population composition of Western countries by replacing white people with people with a different cultural or ethnic background. Based on the idea that the survival of the white race is held back by a Jewish elite, the population theory leads to a revival of anti-Semitism. Right-wing extremists believe that the birth rates of white people should increase and also oppose miscegenation, of feminists, the lhbti scene and immigrants. Accelerationists see violence and race war as the answer to the supposed population.
A worrying development is that the depopulation theory has also moved from the corners of the internet to more mainstream discussions in the Netherlands.. Openly and uncritically discussing such xenophobic and partly racist ideas, and other conspiracy theories, contributes to social acceptance. Research shows that the repeated propagation of such ideas in the media and on social media contributes to its further normalization. This is by no means to say that all propagators of the ideology also approve of terrorist violence, but it can contribute to right-wing extremists feeling legitimized in their ideas.
Right-wing terrorist attacks inspired by accelerationism and the population theory
This year it has been shown several times that violence can arise from right-wing extremist online environments. Both the 18-year-old perpetrator of an attack in May on colored visitors to a supermarket in the American city of Buffalo (ten dead), as the 19-year-old perpetrator of an attack on an LGBTI bar in the Slovak capital Bratislava in October (two dead) shared right-wing extremist manifestos justifying their actions. The Slovak, who, in his own words, radicalized on right-wing extremist internet forums, referred to accelerationism in his manifesto, previous right-wing terrorist attackers, possible targets and Jew-hatred. The perpetrator of the attack in Buffalo also found inspiration in previous right-wing terrorist attackers. The American shared images of his attack via a live stream and he also published a voluminous manifesto in which he described himself as a racist, fascist and anti-Semite. Ideologically, the perpetrator of the attack in Buffalo mainly bases himself on the above-mentioned population theory. Although the perpetrator does not explicitly refer to accelerationism, the idea that the alleged population must be stopped by force is also central to his manifesto.
The Slovak attacker's manifesto has been shared and praised on accelerationist and neo-Nazi channels. According to partner services, the attack in Buffalo is assessed differently in closed channels of Dutch right-wing extremists. Classical neo-Nazis see little in such an attack because these types of attacks are counterproductive for their own political projects - in which they also invoke the repopulation theory. Accelerationists react more positively: they spread jokes and memes and refer to the perpetrator – as with previous right-wing terrorist attackers – as a saint.
Right-wing extremist groups are coming together again
Classic right-wing extremists meet again more often during physical meetings. Since the end of the restrictive corona measures 2022 small groups of neo-Nazis and anti-Islam demonstrators gather for demonstrations, protest actions, sticker promotions, physical training or joint activities such as walks and drinks. Several dozen Dutch people also visited extreme right-wing events in Belgium, Germany and Hungary and have contact with like-minded people in Scandinavia. In addition, known and new right-wing extremist groups make themselves heard online and through visible expressions in the public space. The enthusiasm for the known right-wing extremist groups in the Netherlands remains limited and there is no direct threat of violence. However, there may be intimidation of opponents.
The threat of the classic right-wing extremist ideology manifests itself in particular in the undermining of the democratic legal order and in the violation of the rule of law and social cohesion in society. The normalization of the population theory is an example of this. Right-wing extremists actively propagate such ideas and have online and offline reach. Ideas about, for example, the foundation of a white ethno-state challenges the fundamental rights of groups in society. Right-wing extremist ideas can also spread through joining other protests. For example, earlier connections to the radical part of the corona protest and conspiracy theorists led to a mixing of discourses. It is now sometimes difficult to distinguish right-wing extremists from anti-government extremists: it is an amorphous group, where unclear, changing and mixed views often coincide with personal grievances and psychological problems.
Right-wing extremist interest in a job at Defense continues
In 2020 Ministry of Defense noted an increased interest of right-wing extremist young people for a career within the Dutch armed forces, as also described in the previous DTN. They think that the armed forces fit in well with their vision of masculinity, struggle and self-reliance. Some of these right-wing extremists want the military training they can get in the armed forces, committed to transforming society into a white ethno-state. Follow-up research by the MIVD shows that the interest of right-wing extremists in a job with the armed forces continues. It currently concerns a relatively small group of young men and there are no indications that they currently have terrorist intentions. Nevertheless, the presence of right-wing extremists can harm the deployability of the armed forces, in particular through the erosion of social cohesion and reduction of support for protecting democracy and a pluralistic society. As a result, they pose a threat to national security and the democratic legal order.
Right-wing extremists' enthusiasm for leaving Ukraine remains minimal
Dutch right-wing extremists are still not prepared to travel to Ukraine to fight for one of the warring parties. Shortly after Russia at the end of February 2022 Ukraine, a discussion arose between right-wing extremists about whether they are on the Russian or Ukrainian side. On the one hand, Russia was seen as an aggressor, on the other hand, they had difficulty with the Ukrainian president's Jewish background. More generally, right-wing extremists see the war as a brotherly battle in which white people become victims, and keep aloof. To date, hardly any Dutch right-wing extremists have left for Ukraine. There also does not seem to be a large influx of right-wing extremists from other European countries to the conflict area.(…)Within the nitrogen protest, various actors are using the government's plans from different motives to protest. There are different groups that are often separate from each other and without coordination, strategy or coordination operate. In the first place, this concerns farmers who are affected by the government's plans and who mainly take action for economic and identity reasons. In addition, there is a group of farmers who are not directly affected by the cabinet plans and other sympathizers who feel related to the protests.. This group is also driven by identitarian motives or anti-government sentiments. A final group are anti-government activists and extremists, conspiracy theorists and, to a lesser extent, right-wing extremists seeking to join the protest. They see nitrogen policy as part of a malignantly oppressive agenda that the government, according to both the elite narrative and the depopulation theory, would pursue. The distinction between the groups that together form the nitrogen protest is not absolute: they have no hard boundaries and can flow into each other. It is also not always clear who is behind specific actions; protesting farmers or anti-government activists.
The connection of anti-government extremists and conspiracy theorists to the nitrogen protest can lead to hardening. With a few exceptions, for the time being, most farmers seem to be little receptive to the interference of anti-government extremists and right-wing extremists. To date, there seems to be no significant and/or lasting cooperation between protesting farmers and extremist groups. It does seem, however, that parts of the peasant protest movement are adopting the methods of the anti-government movement. A rapprochement is possible in the future, given the common ground that at least the anti-government extremists see, the terminology used by protesting farmers and the possibilities that an association between the two groups would offer to increase the following.

Monitor the extreme right in the Netherlands 2020

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In this monitor report right-wing extremism, attention is paid to the development of the extreme right-wing field in the Netherlands in 2020. This is done in a longitudinal context, whereby we always place the research period within the framework of a longer development. We first pay attention to the definition and demarcation of the term extreme right. We then provide insight into the manifestations and manifestations of the extreme right. Finally, we will discuss various forms of (government)response to the phenomenon.
Open sources have been used for the compilation of this overview, to a large extent primary sources: Publications, websites and other digital media channels of extreme right-wing organizations and their supporters, conversations with (voormalige) right-wing extremists and observations of public activities (demonstraties) of these organizations. The collected data was further analyzed and framed using existing literature on right-wing extremism in the Netherlands and compared and interpreted with insights from other observers of the extreme right field..

Research Online anti-Semitism in 2020

Utrecht Data School Utrecht University
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Research commissioned by CIDI.

Summary:

The research focuses on textual expressions on six different mainstreamsources: Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, YouTube, Telegram and a selection of weblogs and
websites. Using automatic classification models, this study has
200.395 expressions of online anti-Semitism in 2020 examined. The most important
findings of this study are per platform:

1. On Twitter we find by far the most anti-Semitic expressions in the corner of the rightconservative accounts and conspiracy theorists. Within this group, in absolute
numbers more than seven times as many anti-Semitic messages posted than by the
group with the second most anti-Semitic expressions. It is striking that this cluster
at the same time has close ties to pro-Israel accounts. The anti-Semitism in this
group often targets well-known targets of conspiracy theorists: the jewish
Billionaire George Soros and the Bilderberg Conference.

2. On websites, blogs and forums appear to contain the majority of anti-Semitic expressions
find in the comments left by users. George play here too
Soros and Bilderberg a leading role. Right-wing populist news sites and conspiracy blogs
are dominant in both absolute and relative terms in the number of anti-Semitic statements.

3. The number of anti-Semitic messages on Facebook is relatively low in this study. Now That
is largely due to limited access to Facebook data. The share
anti-Semitic messaging is about eight times higher in Facebook groups than on
Facebook pages. In the groups with the most anti-Semitic messages we find
lots of conspiracy theories; also from a Christian background.

4. On Telegram we see a lot of anti-Semitism in youth groups. This antisemitism
is much more explicit than we find on Facebook and Twitter: 'Jewish' here becomes as
swear word used, and Judaism presented as something contemptible. De
anti-Semitic expressions are less politicized here. In addition to youth groups
do we also find antisemitism in conspiracy groups, where the form is also more explicit than
in similar conspiracy groups on Facebook and Twitter.

5. We find a relatively high amount of anti-Semitism on YouTube: striking here is that the
anti-Semitic statements are mainly placed under videos from mainstreamchannels, like PowNed, WNL, Telegraaf and Rijnmond.

6. On Reddit we see less clear patterns in the anti-Semitic expressions, especially
because conspiracy theories are discussed here ironically to a great extent, and the for
our computer models are still relatively difficult, revealing subtle forms of irony of
to distinguish seriousness. We do see many implicit anti-Semitic expressions in the
(unofficial) Forum for Democracy subreddit, while the explicit anti-Semitic
expressions mainly concern the use of 'Jewish' as ​​a swear word

How Forum Politicians Reinforce Anti-Semitism on Twitter

Qualitative and Quantitative Research on Anti-Semitism in Accounts Retweeted by FVD Politicians
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This investigation looks at the retweets of anti-Semitic accounts by FVDers.

Conclusion from this report:
FVD politicians retweet and like tweets from anti-Semitic accounts significantly more often
or tweets with an anti-Semitic undertone than politicians from other parties. From the
qualitative analysis shows that the two main categories in the antisemitic
tweets from these accounts are “hardcore” and “diffuse” anti-Semitism. The first kind
explicitly targets Jews and is part of the core message of the
accounts. The second is characterized by anti-Semitic stereotypes and
story motifs, but is intertwined with other conspiracy theories such as QAnon and
de Great Reset.
The quantitative analysis shows that no Dutch political party
standalone 'hardcore antisemitism' tweet. Do retweet and like Forum politicians
for Democracy almost five times more often tweets from 'hardcore anti-Semitic' accounts
than random Twitter users (this concerns in particular not explicit
anti-Semitic tweets from accounts that are structurally “hardcore anti-Semitic”
spread tweets). Retweet or like other Dutch political parties like this
good as never tweets from 'hardcore antisemitic' accounts. Forum retweet and like
average 33 ‘hardcore antisemitische’ tweets per 5000 tweets, retweets en likes.
For the random set, this number is 9, for the PVV on 1 and for everyone else
parties on 0. In addition, follow 17 from 36 FvD-accounts 1 or more ‘hardcore
antisemitic' accounts. For example, for the PVV, this number is 'only' at 1 en
for other parties on 0.
In addition, there is no less than more than 10 percent of all Twitter activity
of the investigated FVD politicians from liking and retweeting 'diffuse'
antisemitic' accounts. For the PVV this number is 2 percent, for the
random set at just under 1 percent and for all other parties on 0. Ook
FVD spreads most of the Holocaust comparisons and tweets that use alt-right jargon
contain (slang linked to anti-Semitic fringe media). Only for the category
'anti-Israel' we find the highest activity in the party THINK. THINK likes and
retweet average 9 ‘anti-Israel’-tweets per 5000 likes en retweets. For Bij1, D66,
FVD, GL and the random set is this number on 1. For PVV and SGP on 0.

AIVD jaarverslag 2021

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Within the Netherlands, many threats involved 2021 related to increasing division and hardening in society. Last year the AIVD gained a better view of 'accelerationists': a new generation of young right-wing extremists who glorify terrorist violence in online groups with the aim of: unleashing chaos and race war in the Netherlands. The AIVD also saw part of the anti-government protest radicalize into violent extremism. This was reflected in sometimes public intimidation and vigilance and in (deadly)threats against prominent politicians, among others.
(…)

Right-wing extremism

■ In 2021 right-wing extremist groups gained more support. Conspiracy thinking, among other things, gave this an impulse.
■ Right-wing extremists try to make their worldview seem normal to a larger audience.
■ When right-wing extremist ideas are more widely embraced, threatens to undermine the democratic legal order.
■ Right-wing extremists applaud chaos, exclude minorities and justify violence, hoping for real, violent revolution in the Netherlands.

Despite their differences, share national socialist, People nationalist, alt-right and neo-Nazi groups a worldview in which the white population of (among other) The Netherlands is structurally disadvantaged, and even in pre-existence is threatened by 'repopulation' or genocide. The main source of that threat has been seen in immigration in the recent past, especially from muslim countries. Rond 2015, when ISIS rose and tens of thousands of Syrian refugees came to the West, many new ones emerged, extremist anti-Islam groups. They thought they should do something to help Dutch and Dutch people
to defend traditions against violent jihadists, and against what they saw as the importation of Islamic values ​​by the government, intended to destroy own race and culture. Right-wing extremists still see immigration as a danger, especially when it comes to muslims. But at the moment they see the greatest threat especially in plots by a powerful Jewish elite that would be bent on oppressing the people.. In the reading of right-wing extremists, Jews can do this thanks to international networks and influential positions in, among other things, the financial and cultural world.. The idea that Jews have a preconceived plan to dominate the world is old in right-wing extremist circles. The alt-right movement in particular is now breathing new life into this. The conspiracy theories of anti-government extremists about freedom-restricting measures give that further impetus. Right-wing extremists actively try to recruit among anti-government activists, responding to their dissatisfaction. In doing so, right-wing extremist ideas get mixed up with the ideas of some anti-government extremists, and sometimes blur the boundaries between the different groups. That makes it a small step to explain corona measures as yet another way to corner white Westerners. Or to come up with new conspiracy theories. Like the idea that Bill Gates, whether or not in coordination with a (Jewish) shadow elite, used the corona vaccination program to microchip and control part of the population, or even weaken and kill.

Right-wing extremists also feel the threat on a cultural level: in the emancipation of women, gays or transgender people, and in the woke movement. They would be the media, using the education and culture sector to attack traditional values ​​and gender roles.
Many right-wing extremists live in the expectation that this cultural clash will lead to actual results within five to ten years, violent struggle in the Netherlands – a race war. They believe that it gives room for the founding of a fascist, white ethnostate.
Yet most right-wing extremist groups are currently wary of propagating that violent worldview too confrontationally.. Although they don't shy away from explicit hate online, they seem to have learned from the past that acting aggressively in public—like the skinheads of yore—repels rather than attracts potential followers.
Most groups seem to focus mainly on discrediting the current rule of law and dominating the cultural debate, in order to increase their following and make more minds ripe for their (political) agenda.
An exception to this are terrorist spin-offs and loners, for whom chaos, violence and the disintegration of society cannot come soon enough. Read more about Right-wing terrorism on page 6.
Many right-wing extremist groups ensure that they do not stand out from the rest of the population by, for example, choice of words or clothing. No army chests or tattoos – the dress code in many right-wing extremist groups is jacket-tie.
Many extremists also publicly distance themselves from violence. Yet they do consider violence a legitimate means of realizing their agenda. They deliberately only discuss this in their own (decided) kring.

In their expressions, right-wing extremists ride on already living dissatisfaction. As said to anti-government activists. But also for people who cannot find affordable housing. (An opening for extremists to discuss immigration.) Washing out the woke movement (an action movement concerned with social inequality, especially racism) enlarge them out, to be able to respond to annoyance about it. The vast majority of right-wing extremist groups in the Netherlands are currently not expecting a terrorist attack. However, they are indeed a danger to the democratic legal order.
By denying others their rights, they threaten to slowly undermine the rule of law. That lays a foundation for the desired chaos, hatred and violence.
Such insidious undermining is already happening as more people accept their extremist ideas as normal and factual. To this end, extremists sometimes use (pseudo)scientific jargon.
Right-wing extremists succeed in their goal if, for example, it becomes common to see living together exclusively as a continuous conflict, in terms of us and them. Als (disguised) anti-Semitism and hatred of cultural minorities, women, gay and transgender people are no longer recognized as such. And if many people would lose faith, that the best representative of everyone's interests is ultimately a shared rule of law.

right terrorism
■ “Accelerationism” – a violent movement within right-wing extremism – was in 2021 a growing problem.
■ In closed online chat groups, accelerationists glorify terrorist violence. Vulnerable boys are often sucked into it, and can radicalize quickly.
■ An attack by right-wing terrorist loners or groups is conceivable.
Last year, the AIVD gained a better view of a new generation of young right-wing extremists, who glorify terrorist violence and fantasize about committing violence in closed online groups. Added up, the groups have several hundred followers and new groups are added all the time. Like other right-wing extremists, they expect a race war in the future, which offers the opportunity to found a white ethno state.
But unlike most right-wing extremists, this movement wants to see that battle break out as soon as possible. If necessary, they want to initiate it themselves, by committing terrorist attacks and (with that) set populations against each other. The expectation is that only a small minority are terrorist themselves
want to use violence, but it is difficult to predict who will make that step.
Because of that desire to accelerate chaos and race war, the movement is referred to as 'accelerationism'. That term was coined by the American National Socialist James Mason, which is a source of inspiration for the movement. Mason believes right-wing extremists can never gain power through political means – government would stand in their way. Therefore, incumbent governments and existing power structures must be wiped out. Only violence and chaos can cause that. As far as we know, they are mainly (young) men participating in accelerationist groups. Most are between the 13 en 30 years old. It's a generation that grew up with the internet. That's where they go to get in touch and look for information. That's mainly where they meet. Out of sight of their surroundings, what means that radicalization can remain invisible for a long time.

Accelerationist ideas are particularly popular among young people who are particularly susceptible to radicalization because of their background. Many suffer from psychopathological disorders that are linear, make black and white thinking attractive to them. This is true to some extent for extremists from all walks of life.

Accelerationists often come from broken families, and they don't have a social safety net. Some have been bullied and have difficulty in school. The right-wing extremist emphasis on white superiority, on masculinity and violence is attractive compensation for some people. Having a gun means power – that's why they're interested in sting- and firearms and working for the Ministry of Defence. They also see that as a preparation for what they see as
inevitable race war. Accelerationist groups recruit vulnerable young people in a sophisticated way. This is done through online gaming platforms and
social media. Potential members are eventually asked to join private groups.
Groups do have drivers (the administrator of a chat group usually) and some form of internal hierarchy, But that doesn't mean there is real leadership. It's more groups of loners inspiring each other. Groups are flexible. They can pop up and disappear again, and come back in another form in another place.
Once in such an online chat group, young people become part of a world in which images of enemies are constantly, hatred, racism and violence are shared. And where they speak very derogatoryly of imagined enemies. Members talk to each other about buying weapons, manufacturing bombs, and committing attacks. They share manifestos that attackers (from other countries) have spread for inspiration, and live streams of attacks. They also venerate attackers as saints. Some groups have ideas about a kind of Valhalla, that white martyrs would wait for the good cause.
Individuals actually help each other in preparing and committing attacks. To this end, weapon manuals, military training videos and guerrilla tactics shared. Accelerationism has led to terrorist violence worldwide that has killed people. Not yet in the Netherlands.
Well there are in 2021 Six official messages sent by the AIVD about accelerationists, on the basis of which the Public Prosecution Service (ABOUT) and the National Police could act. This has led to several arrests.
Following an official message from the AIVD, in December 2021 two Dutchmen convicted of incitement to a terrorist crime, and for participating in the right-wing extremist and terrorist organization 'The Base'.
Supporters of accelerationism present a special challenge to society. Because it often concerns vulnerable loners who constantly incite each other, can the step to violence be taken quickly and poorly noticed by the environment. That requires alertness and resolute action.

To prevent further radicalization where possible, culminating in violence, to prevent, does the service provide customization. In doing so, the AIVD involves partners in care and assistance within and outside the criminal justice chain. If information from the service contributes to a care intervention through such customization,, does this also contribute to national security.

Anti-government extremism
■The AIVD realized 2021 part of the anti-government protest, especially against corona measures, radicalize.
■This has created violent anti-government extremism. A terrorist attack from that corner is now imaginable.
“A growing group of people are also losing confidence in the democratic legal order and turning their backs on it”.
That some of the anti-government activists radicalized last year, can be seen in the alarming increase in the number of threats from ministers, among others, members of the House of Representatives, scientists, medici, police officers and journalists.
Counts from, among others, the The Hague police, the Public Prosecution Service and the Press Safety hotline have more than doubled the number of reports (600 of politicians, 272 of journalists). Some threats were visible and far-reaching for many Dutch people, such as the one against Prime Minister Rutte and other ministers who symbolized Dutch corona policy.
Anti-government extremists see and treat them (and others they see as “the elite”) as hated enemies of the population. In often very rude emails, tweets, videos and posts announce they will use violence against them, they wish the recipient dead, or do they call on others to do something to him or her.
For some threats, the intention was actually seen to carry out the threats, and preparatory work was done for this. One anti-government extremist is in 2021 for example, arrested on suspicion of preparing an assassination attempt on (among other) Prime Minister Rutte. Another has been convicted of threatening terrorist violence. He was carrying a firearm when he was arrested. Between five and ten anti-government extremists were in detention during the year, one of them in the terrorist ward. They were convicted for (serious) threat or incitement. In previous years this did not or hardly occur.
The AIVD warned in its annual report 2020 even before the emergence of a breeding ground for anti-government extremism. The protest against the government, especially against the corona measures, was mainly activist at the time, although there were already extremist elements. They have since taken flight.
That anti-government extremists have started to think and act more radically, This is partly because they are incited to do so by boosters: appealing conspiracy theorists and critics of, among other things, the government's corona policy, with own media channels. With this they reach at least tens of thousands of people.
In broadcasts, on websites and in magazines they portray politicians and scientists as the new 'evil' ("Satanists" or "Child Abusers"), that with preconceived plans harms the population ('suppress' or 'decimate'). And they make it sound like it's understandable or even good for people to use violence in response. Either spontaneous ('lynch'), or organized in the form of 'tribunals'. Often they choose their words like this, that they are not punishable.
The drivers profile themselves on their media channels as experts. They are often eloquent and well-educated, what makes them credible to their audience. They're not just talking about corona, but use all kinds of news events to repeat the same kinds of messages and increase their following (so-called 'trigger events', for example the introduction of 5G). To this end, they structurally share disinformation – stories that fit their worldview, but which they often know are not true.
Their messages resonate more quickly with people who feel insecure about their income or future, and blame the government. And to people who think the government is acting unfairly. Some of their supporters actually became the victims of government failure in recent years, whether they saw that others were victims of it.
People's anger can also focus on one specific topic, for example the asylum, climate- or nitrogen policy or not being able to find housing. That can make them sensitive to ideas from boosters. Just like groups that already had the idea that society is going in the wrong direction anyway. Whoever wants, easily connects because the anti-government protest has no fixed ideological program.
The hardening among anti-government extremists seems to be exacerbated by (social) insulation. Many of them spend a lot of time online, and only encounter more extreme messages due to unilateral information gathering and the operation of algorithms. They also hear less dissenting voices in the physical world.
Discussions about the coronavirus, among other things, sometimes drive a wedge in families and groups of friends. This can ensure that people not only lose faith in institutions, but also in the people around them, so that they mainly look for like-minded people.
The hardening is also due to the involvement of right-wing extremist groups. Right-wing extremists sometimes hijack the anti-government protest for their own sake (Violent) to get the message out and to recruit people. On some themes, right-wing extremists and anti-government extremists are also growing towards each other. They also share conspiracy thinking. Both can be opportunistic in their cooperation: together they have more mass.
All these developments make anti-government extremism harder and more dangerous. In the first place, there is the danger that extreme ideas can degenerate into violence. A terrorist attack by an anti-government extremist is so imaginable. At the same time, there is an insidious and serious threat to democracy: that mistrust, disinformation and polarization that will corrode.
That it becomes so common to think hostile about politicians, scientists, journalists, Police, judges and people who think differently, that the Netherlands is more divided and belief in the democratic legal order is crumbling.
Addressing such undemocratic goals, or use of undemocratic means, is difficult but necessary. Extremism must be distinguished from completely legitimate protest. And people who don't trust the government, will see more action by public authorities as confirmation of their ideas.

Some anti-government extremists and activists are now increasingly withdrawing into their own parallel society. Some extremists organize their own 'police' or so-called 'defend groups', who do not recognize and challenge the state's monopoly on violence – they themselves say they have to protect protesters from the alleged brutality of the police.
There are activists who only follow their own media, and transition to homeschooling and taking or keeping their children out of school. Hundreds of people unsubscribed from the electoral register, because they no longer have faith in fair governance. So they gradually turn, but more and more, from the rest of society.

Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 56

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The following is written about the extreme right:
Right-wing extremism
Within right-wing extremism, accelerationism is the current
where the greatest threat of violence emanates. Several hundred
Dutch accelerationists have come into the picture online; van
a few may threaten. On various online networks of
this movement appears to have a fascination for weapons. Is
involves ensuring that individuals with these ideological
background join the armed forces or a shooting club
want to register in order to gain experience with the use of
weapons. The war in Ukraine may be attractive
on Dutch right-wing extremists, but for now it seems
right-wing extremists have little enthusiasm to leave for
Ukraine and join right-wing extremist groups
on the Ukrainian or Russian side.

(…)

The right-wing extremist threat dissected
To prevent important developments and incidents in the current
To be able to interpret the Dutch right-wing extremist landscape
can be divided into three categories,
namely: the classic right-wing extremism (including the
neonazism), intellectual right-wing extremism (for example
Erkenbrand) and accelerationism. Classic neo-Nazi
organizations such as Blood & Honour, Combat 18 in Racial
Volunteer Force hardly seems to play a role at the moment
meaning to play in the Netherlands and intellectual right-wing extremism has not come into the picture in the last six months.
In previous DTNs, attention has already been paid to the
accelerationisme, that in a relatively short time from the United
States has also taken root in other western countries.
Supporters of this right-wing extremist ideology
glorify and justify terrorist violence so as to
accelerate a race war. Because of this they want
create chaos and replace the current political system with
a white one (As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one) As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one. Within the right-wing extremist spectrum in the Netherlands, most
threat of violence from this movement. It's about a few
a hundred Dutch young people who secretly
online communication platforms where it is
accelerationist ideas are propagated. De
estimate remains that a few may be subject to a threat of violence
exit. In particular, account should be taken of
small to medium attacks with regular
means of attack, like stitch- and firearms and explosives.
Given the psychosocial problems that various
accelerationists wrestle with, their youthfulness and the low
organizational degree, the question is to what extent they
actually be able to perform an attack with some complexity
prepare and execute.
Previous criminal investigation into The Base in the Netherlands
led end 2020 until the arrest and later until the conviction
of two young men. In december 2021 condemned the
court in Rotterdam these men from 20 en 21 years before
participation in a terrorist organization and incitement to a
Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 56
22
terrorist crime. Both got 24 months
imprisonment, whose 18 months probation, en een
community service. The 21-year-old man was acquitted of the
preparing a terrorist crime. He suggested in a
chat room that he would possess a document containing the
cycling routes of Prime Minister Rutte. However, such a document is
not found in his possession. The 21-year-old man would end
november 2020 start training in defense,
which was prevented by his arrest. After the arrests
from end 2020 no more arrests have been made of young
Dutch accelerationists.
In recent months, it has become apparent that the differences between the
diverse groups within the broad right-wing extremist
online scene rather be covered up than magnified as long as
the core or ultimate goal of the right-wing extremist
ideas but still standing, namely the white one
world domination.
The right-wing extremist movement in the Netherlands that has been
was limited offline, is also at the time of the
corona measures have only been able to be effective to a limited extent
respond to dissatisfaction with the corona policy. The anti-government narrative of an oppressive government closes
However, it fits well with the right-wing extremist conspiracy theory
that the Jewish/left-wing elite follow the Dutch tradition, cultuur, race
and language would not protect. As a result, there is more
intertwining between anti-government extremists and
right-wing extremist supporters and people know each other
mainly found online. During corona protests there was
there is already some mixing with right-wing extremists.
Interest from right-wing extremist angle for
firearms
The police are investigating criminal online expressions of
members and administrators of accelerationist accounts and
chat groups. In these circles there appears to be a great fascination for
all kinds of weapons to exist. On Wednesday 9 februari 2022 was
after an official message from the AIVD, a 33-year-old suspect in
Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 56
23
Zeeland arrested for having a 3D printed semi-automatic firearm. The guy did online
various right-wing extremist and racist expressions and
was also in possession of right-wing extremist flags and other
memorabilia. This arrest therefore seems to be an illustration of
the observation that right-wing extremists are increasingly
are more likely to be interested in 3D-printed firearms. This is
worrisome because this is the threshold to actually committing
van (terrorist) can lower violence. The National Unit
of the Police is currently conducting a broader investigation
to 3D-printed firearms in the Netherlands, which mainly
occur within the (non-ideological) criminal circuit. Bee
the police receive several signals that subjects
be or try to be a member within the right-wing extremist landscape
to become a shooting club or otherwise interested
have in weapons and in training with them.
Concerns about the appeal of the armed forces to
right-wing extremist youth
The MIVD noted in its annual report in 2020 that some
right-wing extremist young people in the Netherlands it attractive
find work for the armed forces. the earlier
said 21-year-old man seems to be a new example of this
zijn. Radicalization within elements of the armed forces is
Risky, in particular with regard to access to and training with
weapons. In recent years, there have been several
examples of defense employees who radicalized and
used or threatened violence. The attraction
of the armed forces on right-wing extremist young people is too
to declare. Thus, the external presentation of accelerationist
groups very militaristic inspired. Values ​​and standards that
apply within the armed forces, like camaraderie, courage and
fidelity, are also highly regarded by many right-wing extremists.
There is also within parts of the right-wing extremist movement
a strong affinity with weapons. A relatively new phenomenon
is that in accelerationist online networks becomes
advised to use the defense equipment for gaining
from combat- and weapon skills to physically represent
prepare for any (end)conflict. The accretion of the
Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 56
24
right-wing extremist movement is often very young. Being
people who still have to make their career choice for the future
and can easily be influenced by
right-wing extremist sentiment.
Little enthusiasm for right-wing extremists for the time being
leave for Ukraine
Shortly after Russia at the end of February 2022 Ukraine military
attacked, Ukrainian President Zelensky announced that
a 'foreign legion' would be set up. Soon were
According to the Ukrainian embassy in The Hague, there are more than 200
registrations from the Netherlands, both from people with a
Ukrainian or Polish background if of native
Nederlanders, including veterans. Because this group
may be able to do combat training, can there
security risks (especially within your own personal
lifestyle) act when they come back. Due to the non-extremist nature of the official Ukrainian
'foreign legion' is unlikely to participate
this entails risks for the Netherlands from a CT perspective
will bring. However, there is also a risk that the war
can attract right-wing extremists in the Netherlands in Ukraine. This wouldn't be a new phenomenon.
Between 2014 en 2021 according to scientists some fought
Dutch right-wing extremists in Ukraine, some at the
Ukrainian, others at the separatist/Russian
battle groups. If necessary, participants in the
violent conflict can end up in right-wing extremist units. When they returned to the Netherlands, they would
could pose a risk to national security.
For the time being, however, it is unlikely that large numbers
right-wing extremists will leave for the war zone.
With most right-wing extremists in the Netherlands it looks like
currently the willingness to go to Ukraine to
are missing.
Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 56
25
International developments right-wing extremism
Intertwining right-wing extremist groups and anti-government groups abroad
In Canada, Spain, Ireland, Australia, The United Kingdom
and Germany have security- and intelligence services a
major interdependence of the corona resistance with right-wing extremist organizations established. More than in the Netherlands
Is the protest violent?. A few
examples from other countries illustrate the violent
polarization that occurred around the
corona resistance has become visible. Eind 2021 got into New
York right-wing extremists during anti-vaccination rallies
clashed with counter-protesters. In oktober 2021 names
Italian neo-fascists and protesters in Rome participate in
a mass protest against vaccines that degenerated into violence and
an attempt to storm the prime minister's office. In
the same country has right-wing extremists after a demonstration
the headquarters of a trade union against the corona pass
destroyed. In Belgium, the right-wing extremist
instrumentalization of the corona protests noticeable when there
during protests in Brussels against the measures end 2021 en
begin 2022 riots broke out.

(…)

During a flare protest against the corona policy
op 12 January 2022 in Utrecht there was a
violent confrontation from a group of anti-fascists who
turned against anti-corona measures protesters,
including persons associated with the extreme right
splinter party NCE.

Transnational Nationalism

Hans Janmaat and the International Contacts of the Center Democrats
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This thesis concerns the international contacts of the Centrumdemocraten and how the leader of the radical right party influenced the international contacts. I thought of the topic due to my interest in political leadership and the radical right. I had read a lot about the international contacts of the current day radical right and was wondering if the radical right formed a transnational network in the past. This precise topic was not one I had looked into during my bachelor’s and master’s degree. I did study a wide breadth of topics. This included courses on neoliberalism, energy transitions, in and out groups in societies, formations of states and political leadership. However political leadership and the radical right have been the most interesting topics to me.

Particulars: MA Thesis Modern History, Leiden University

Factsheet right-wing extremists in Dutch municipalities

Update april 2021
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In spring 2021 the active support of the organized extreme right is consistently small and fragmented, the number of actions carried out modest and the threat of violence minimal. Recently, however, there has been a change in the dynamics surrounding the extreme right, the new
poses threats. In addition, in recent years there has been a reduction in
seeing the social and political resistance to the extreme right, extreme right
opinions and organizations.

AIVD jaarverslag 2020

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Right-wing extremism
Right-wing extremists more often sought the general public by presenting ideas as
respectable and by joining public protests. Online was intensive
contact between extremists worldwide, involving very violent propaganda
was shared.
Right-wing extremist groups in the Netherlands presented
their ideas last year more often as an intellectual way
of thinking, that deserves the attention of the general public.
The so-called alt-right ideology is a mixture of
conspiracy theories, views on white supremacy, and fascist,
national socialist and conservative christian ideas.

Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 55

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There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack, There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack. There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack, There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack.

There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack
There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack, There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack. There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack. There are currently no concrete indications that people in the Netherlands are preparing an attack. As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one (As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one) As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one. As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one. As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one 12 en 20 jaar, As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one. As a result, they want to create chaos in society in which the current political system can be replaced by a white one.

Particulars: Right-wing extremism on page 3, 14, 19, 27 en 29

European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2021

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Interesting pieces about the extreme right, outside the special chapter on p 80-91:

Right-wing (RW) terrorism
In 2020, three EU Member States experienced four terrorist
incidents motivated by right-wing extremism. One terrorist
attack using firearms was committed in Germany and
resulted in the death of nine people;8 another attack plot in
Germany was disrupted. A failed attempt to attack a public
institution occurred in Belgium, while one plot was foiled in
France.
At least three of the four perpetrators were nationals of the
country in which the attack took place or was planned, and
one of them was female.
In 2020, 34 individuals were arrested in eight EU Member
States on suspicion of involvement in right-wing terrorist
activity. Where the offence leading to arrest was reported,9
the most frequent offences were membership of a
terrorist group and attack planning and preparation, often
accompanied by possession of weapons. The suspects
were predominantly male, with an average age of 38, and
nationals of the country in which they were arrested.
The perpetrator of the completed right-wing terrorist
attack in Hanau (Germany) was motivated by racist and
xenophobic ideas, but does not seem to have referred to
previous right-wing attacks like the one in Christchurch (New
Zealand) in 2019, or taken part in transnational right-wing
online communities.10
Arrests of suspects planning to commit terrorist or extremist
attacks were made in several EU Member States in 2020. It
is concerning to note the increasingly young age of suspects
– many of whom were minors at the time of arrest. Most
are linked to transnational violent online communities with
varying degrees of organisation.
These online communities espouse the ‘leaderless
resistance’ concept of the SIEGE culture and accelerationist
ideas. Such ideologies promote the view that attacks by
individuals or small groups, rather than large organisations,
are required to accelerate the anticipated breakdown of
society. This can be used to justify lone-actor attacks, like
those observed in 2019.
Right-wing terrorism and extremism continued
to comprise a very heterogeneous set of
ideologies, political objectives and forms of
organisation, ranging from lone individuals linked
to extremist online communities to hierarchical
organisations. Violent Neo-Nazi and white
supremacist groups were dismantled and/or
banned in several EU Member States, including
Germany and Spain. Their stated aim was to
attack those whom they considered ‘non-whites’,
including people of Jewish or Muslim faith, to
destroy the democratic order, and to create new
communities based on racist ideology. Some of
these groups financed their activities through
criminal means, including drug trafficking.
Combat training and access to weapons are
factors increasing the capabilities of rightwing
extremists to commit acts of violence.
Right-wing extremists often own, and in many
cases collect weapons, and they tend to have
an increasing interest in paramilitary training,
sometimes outside the EU, for example in
Russia.
In 2020 enhanced public awareness of climate
and ecological crises led right-wing extremists
to increasingly promote eco-fascist views.
According to eco-fascism, these crises can be
attributed to overpopulation, immigration and
the democratic systems’ failure to address them.
Video games and video game communication
applications were increasingly used in 2020
to share right-wing terrorist and extremist
advertising, in particular among young people.
Right-wing extremists continued to use a variety
of online platforms, from static websites to
social media and messenger services.
In the EU, Turkish ultranationalists were
involved in confrontations with critics of
Turkish government policies, including Kurdish
protesters.

(…)

Among right-wing extremists also, COVID-19 was observed
to accelerate the trend of spreading propaganda online,
rather than offline. EU Member States noted an increase
in transnational right-wing activities online, while in-person
contact was limited by COVID-19 restrictions on movement.

Right-wing extremists exploited COVID-19 to
support their narratives of accelerationism and conspiracy
theories featuring anti-Semitism, and anti-immigration and
anti-Islam rhetoric. Left-wing and anarchist extremists also
incorporated criticism of government measures to combat
the pandemic into their narratives.

(…)

The level of activity concerning explosiverelated
attacks linked to right-wing terrorism
or extremism did not increase further
compared to 2019 and the identified trends.
The methods still included the commission
of arson and explosive attacks with simple
improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) or IEDs
constructed with readily available materials. In
addition, some incidents once more showed
that right-wing terrorists were still interested in
and capable of manufacturing more complex
HMEs, such as TATP and nitroglycerine.

(…)

Right-wing extremists discussed methods to use
COVID-19 as a weapon: close contact, airborne and fomite
transmissions were suggested as sources of contamination
targeting minorities, politicians, police officers and
medical staff. Shipping of contaminated products was
also suggested. Taking advantage of the COVID-19 crisis,
right-wing extremists further suggested attacks on critical
infrastructure, governmental facilities and the use of cyanide
to contaminate drinking products.

(…)

Links to larger criminal networks appear to be less common.
Nevertheless, an overlap between organised crime groups
and right-wing extremists, in particular with regard to
weapons procurement and drug trafficking, has been
observed. In January 2020 in Mallorca, for example, Spain
arrested 16 members of United Tribuns Nomads Spain,
the Spanish chapter of an international organisation linked
to drug trafficking and sexual exploitation of women. Part
of the group’s proceeds in Spain was used to finance its
members’ activities in violent right-wing extremist groups,
including football hooligans and neo-Nazi groups38. Also
in Spain, a transnational group trafficking in weapons,
including military weapons, was dismantled in late 2020. The
group was providing weapons to drug trafficking networks in
southern Spain. Three individuals were arrested, including a
German citizen who was linked to right-wing extremist and
neo-Nazi networks and had at his home a collection of Nazi
objects, uniforms and flags.

(…)

Organisations can rely on their members for funding
activities. Violent right-wing extremist organisations in
Finland and Sweden, for example, finance their activities
mainly through membership fees and donations from their
members and supporters. Poland observed that, in addition
to collections from members, right-wing extremist groups
fund their activities through legal private businesses run
by members or by selling nationalist paraphernalia.

(…)

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM
The number of convictions for right-wing terrorism
increased in 2020 (11) compared to 2019 (6). In Germany,
eight German nationals appeared before the Higher Regional
Court of Dresden on charges of participation in a terrorist
organisation and, in one case, leadership of a terrorist
organisation. Five of the defendants were also charged with
other offences of breach of the peace and grievous bodily
harm. The court determined that, in September 2018, the
defendants set up an extremist, right-wing orientated chat
group with the aim of initiating a violent overthrow of the
existing social order. They had planned demonstrations
to take place on the 4 October National Day in Berlin and
considered using firearms. A few days before that, a trial run
took place in the Schlossteichinsel area of Chemnitz, during
which five members of the group were arrested. Further
planning by the defendants was revealed, partly from data
saved on their mobile phones. On 24 March 2020, the court
found all eight defendants guilty. The leader of the group
was sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment,
while the other seven defendants were given prison
sentences between two years and three months and three
years and nine months.
In Lithuania, on 18 September 2020 the Vilnius Regional
Court sentenced one defendant to a prison term of two
years and four months after it established that the man,
who belonged to the right-wing extremist group Feuerkrieg
Division (FKD, ‘Fire War Division’), attempted to commit an
act of terrorism. On 5 October 2019, he placed an improvised
explosive device (IED) at a building but it failed to explode.
He was also convicted of holding explosives for terrorist
purposes and a firearms-related offence.

(…)

The average prison term for separatist and right-wing
terrorism-related offences in 2020 was six years, and for
left-wing terrorism-related offences it was five years. This
average is higher than the average for right-wing terrorismrelated
offences (three years) and separatist terrorismrelated
offences (four years), and lower than the average for
left-wing terrorism-related offences in 2019 (19 years).

Particulars: Reporting of a terrorist threat in the EU. P 80-91 contains chapter that deals with the extreme right.

From action to self-actualization: routes of joining radical- and the extreme right

Routes of joining radical- and the extreme right
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On the Hoefkade in The Hague stood up 10 augustus 2014 a group of radical Muslims
from the Schilderswijk opposite the anti-IS demonstration of the occasional collective
Pro Patria ("For the Fatherland"). Beforehand the rumor machine was running
at full throttle. This is how Pro Patria would like to burn a Quran, reversed
would radical Muslims from the Schilderswijk fire bombs at the demonstration
from Pro Patria want to throw.1
No one on either side remembers who spread the rumours,
but it led to the groups in the heart of the Schilderswijk being diametrically opposed
came face to face. Pro Patria chanted slogans like 'No'
jihad in our street'. The other camp threw bricks and
renamed the riot 'the battle of the Schilderswijk'.2
The Mobile Unit decided that Pro Patria had to deflect, what the procession
of about 150 people eventually after much protest did.3 The group existed
including from well-known radical- and right-wing activists, Vlaamse
nationalists,
ADO fans who just came back from a lost home game
against Feyenoord, Assyrian Christians, concerned citizens and a handful
Kurds, who all marched under the banner of an anti-IS demonstration.
Due to the arrival of some familiar faces from the radical- en
extreme right environment Pro Patria announced strict rules in advance: no
extreme right-wing expressions and only Dutch flags.
Although the procession should have turned, claimed co-initiator Paul Peters
from Pro Patria a win, That's what he told me when I was three and a half years old
later spoke for Elsevier Weekblad. The then mayor of The Hague Jozias
van Aartsen (VVD) after all, the demonstration by Pro . had gotten out of hand
Patria seized the opportunity to organize demonstrations for the time being on the grounds of public order
to be banned in the Schilderswijk. And so radical Muslims could not
more demonstrations in the neighborhood - in which they en passant the Islamic
State encouraged.

Particulars: This is a dissertation

The different faces of the corona protests

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In the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN) 53 wrote the NCTV about the ongoing and sometimes intimidating manifestations of social discontent since the COVID-19 outbreak.

Concerns about the corona protests within society and public administration have only increased due to recent disturbances, such as the riots after the introduction of curfew on 23 January 2021. It is important not to resort to generalizations, but just to describe the different faces of the corona protests. Rioting youths and hooligans are not the same people as peaceful protesters with, for example, grievances about the government. Within the divergent corona protests since the COVID-19 outbreak in February 2020 different backgrounds and motivations can be discerned.

Particulars: Right-wing extremism on page 7 en 8, 22 en 23.

Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands 54

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The threat level is based on DTN 54 determined on level 3. A terrorist attack in the Netherlands is conceivable. There are currently people in the Netherlands who are radicalising or who are strongly radicalized and who are at risk (kunnen) vormen. There are currently no indications that persons in the Netherlands are preparing an attack. It is conceivable, however, that a loner will commit an attack. In recent years, attacks in Europe have mostly been committed by Islamist and jihadist single-acting perpetrators, in whom extremist ideas can sometimes be accompanied by psychosocial or psychiatric problems. The attacks in France and Austria in the autumn of 2020 fit into the picture of the threat posed by individuals. The threat level is based on the elements below.

Particulars: Right-wing extremism on page 4, 12 t/m 14, 19 en 20 en 27 t/m 29.

Monitor anti-Semitic incidents 2020

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CIDI recorded in 2020 135 anti-Semitic incidents in the Netherlands. This brings us back to the same level as the anti-Jewish incidents we registered in 2018. 2019 was a sad low point in the annual CIDI monitor in terms of the number of incidents measured, which appears for the 37th time this year.

Unfortunately, we saw the number of followers of conspiracy theories increase significantly in the past year, both on social media and beyond. It is not uncommon for Jews to be identified as the cause and / or stakeholder in the corona virus. It is good to see that the fight against anti-Semitism has entered the political agenda, both nationally and in some municipalities. There is still a lot of work to be done, but the path taken is hopeful.

Particulars: Far-right anti-Semitism on p 24 t/m 26

the rule of law, a quick scan

The manifesto for the elections 2021 rechtsstatelijk?
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Beschrijving:

The committee found proposals in seven of the fourteen party programs examined that do not pass the test against the minimum standards of the rule of law. This often concerns proposals in the field of immigration and asylum. Those proposals got the disqualification red, usually because they openly discriminate against certain groups of citizens or deny or obstruct their access to justice.
Nevertheless, the picture that the committee has received of the plans of most of the parties investigated is ultimately positive. It is clear that all parties are struggling to answer the question of how our democracy should become political (her)designed to meet the demands of these turbulent times, how citizens can be better involved in far-reaching decisions that have to be taken by politicians, how institutions such as the judiciary can be strengthened, precisely to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.
This is the constitutional task that will bind the parties for the next four years.

Particulars: Forum for Democracy on p 27 en 28, Ja21 on p 30 and 31, PVV on p 33 en 34,

Factsheet Online radical and extremist behavior

Jaar:
2021
Taal:Aantal blz:
23
Soort Uitgave:
Beschrijving:

More and more openly
Over the past few decades, it has become radical online- and extreme right-wing landscape has taken off. In addition, racist and dehumanizing statements are no longer only made under a pseudonym in a corner of the internet on a web forum like Stormfront., but increasingly openly shared on social media. This fact sheet has been prepared to gain more insight into this online world and its significance for the offline world. The online world fulfills various functions in this regard: recruiting, generate attention, mobiliseren, spread ideology, finding like-minded people, ideological justification, trolling and doxing, undermining social cohesion and government and entertainment. Although the online range of known physical (offline) radically- and extreme right-wing groups is relatively small and the threat of violence has been low for years, is there a continuation of a previously observed "threatening culture". Racist and dehumanizing messages are not distributed from major channels, but rather shared bottom-up by a network of individual users. These increased racist comments and hate speech contribute to further polarization and undermining of social cohesion, especially when it comes to dehumanization and increasing hostility towards groups with a migrant background. The online landscape is constantly changing. The information in the fact sheet is a snapshot of September 2020. We update this fact sheet periodically.